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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Seventeen months separated the filing of the State's complaint accusing Larry Ray
Halbert of felony DUI and vehicular manslaughter from his jury trial date. Mr. Halbert filed a
motion to dismiss, asserting the delay violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy
trial. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
On appeal, Mr. Halbert asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss. The delay violated Mr. Halbert's federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's findings of fact, on December 13, 2017, law enforcement
and EMS responded to an automobile collision on US 93 in Jerome County. (R., p.223.) Police
reports stated that Mr. Halbert "crossed the center line striking a car traveling southbound in a
head on collision."

(R., p.223.)

"Cheryl Ann Miller, the driver in the southbound lane,

succumbed to her injuries on scene." (R., p.223.) Mr. Halbert was extricated from his car and
immediately taken to a hospital.

(See R., p.223.) He had open fractures in both legs, and

underwent emergency surgery. (See De£ Ex. 1.)
The district court found that, for the next year, Mr. Halbert ''was provided significant
medical treatment while in the custody ofIDOC .... " (R., p.223.) On December 29, 2017, he
"was arrested on a Parole Commission Warrant and transported to a Boise prison to address his
medical issues." (Presentence Report, 12/09/19 (hereinafter, PSI), p.16.) At the time of the
collision, Mr. Halbert was on parole in a separate felony DUI case. (See PSI, pp.15-16.) He had
a second surgery in January of 2018. (See De£ Ex. 1.) Mr. Halbert developed pain in his right
leg, and had a third surgery in July of 2018, after X-rays showed hardware failure of the screws
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in his right tibia. (See De£ Ex. 1.) The district court found, "By January of 2019, over a year
after the accident, [Mr. Halbert] was still in the Medical Annex at IDOC." (R., p.223.)
Meanwhile, on March 23, 2018, the State filed a Criminal Complaint against Mr. Halbert,
alleging he had committed felony driving under the influence of alcohol (found guilty of two or
more violations within the past ten years) and vehicular manslaughter. (R., pp.13-16.) However,
Mr. Halbert did not appear in front of a magistrate on the charges until February 19, 2019. (See
R., p.21.) At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Halbert testified that he received the
criminal complaint and warrant of arrest on June 27, 2018. (See 09/09/19 Tr., p.21, L.7 - p.22,
L.1; De£ Ex.2.) The district court instead determined that the warrant was served on Mr. Halbert
on February 15, 2019, after he had been transported to Jerome County. (See R., p.221.)
Mr. Halbert filed a motion to continue his preliminary hearing, set for February 27, 2019,
because his defense counsel had been recently appointed and requested additional time to review
discovery. (See R., pp.29-30, 55-56.) The magistrate granted the motion and continued the
preliminary hearing to March 14, 2019. (R., pp.58-59.) Mr. Halbert subsequently filed another
motion to continue the preliminary hearing, on the basis his defense counsel requested additional
time to obtain, examine, and review video evidence. (See R., pp.84-86.) The magistrate also
granted this motion, scheduling the preliminary hearing for May 2, 2019. (R., pp.87-88, 91.)
Mr. Halbert later waived his preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to the
district court on the charges. (See R., pp.92-96.)
Mr. Halbert filed a motion requesting that his arraignment hearing be reset from May 6,
2019, to April 29, 2019. (R., pp.98-100.) In the motion, defense counsel asserted that, before
Mr. Halbert had been transported to the Jerome County Jail, he "had been undergoing physical
therapy via the Idaho Department of Correction[]," where he "is serving time for a separate
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case." (R., p.98.) Mr. Halbert's counsel asserted that "once Mr. Halbert is arraigned in District
Court, for the now pending Jerome County charges, he is to be transported back to the Idaho
penitentiary facilities where Mr. Halbert may be able to resume his medical treatment."
(R., p.98.) The district court granted the motion to reset the arraignment hearing. (R., pp.10102.) On April 29, 2019, Mr. Halbert entered a not guilty plea to the charges at his arraignment
hearing. (R., p.115.) The same day, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Halbert with
felony DUI and vehicular manslaughter. (R., pp.103-06.)
The district court scheduled Mr. Halbert's jury trial to commence on September 24, 2019.
(R., pp.110-14.) The court also scheduled a status conference for August 5, 2019. (R., p.111.)

Mr. Halbert subsequently filed a motion to vacate and continue the August 5 status conference,
"because he is scheduled to undergo medical surgery next week [the week of August 5]. The
scheduled surgery next week is intended to repair damage to his leg(s) that resulted from the car
crash." (R., pp.126-28.) The district court granted the motion, vacated the status conference,
and reset the status conference for August 26, 2019. (R., pp.129-30.)
On August 5, 2019, Mr. Halbert filed a Motion to Dismiss "with prejudice pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-3501(2), U.S. Const. Idaho Const. Art. 1 §§ 13 & [18] on the basis that
Mr. Halbert' s due process rights and right to a fair and speedy trial were violated." (R., pp.13134.) He asserted that his statutory right to a speedy trial under Section 19-3501(2) had been
violated. (See R., pp.132-33.) Mr. Halbert also asserted: "The State has had over a year to build
its case against Mr. Halbert. Now, Mr. Halbert must contact witnesses, gather evidence, and
attempt to recall facts, times, places and people more than one [year] after the incident; this puts
Mr. Halbert at a significant disadvantage and is highly prejudicial to his case." (R., p.133.)
"Therefore, because it has taken almost one year between the filing of the warrant and the
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criminal complaint and the execution of the warrant and commencement of the trial process,
Mr. Halbert's statutory and constitutional rights a speedy trial have been abrogated." (R., p.133.)
The State filed a response to Mr. Halbert's motion to dismiss. (R., pp.166-75.) The State
argued that Mr. Halbert' s statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial had not been
violated. (See R., p.174.)
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Halbert and a Jerome County Sheriffs
Department employee testified. (See generally 09/09/19 Tr.) When asked by the district court
about prejudice to Mr. Halbert from the delay, defense counsel replied: "So due to the delay,
obviously, you know, time has passed and we would contend that that is prejudicial to our
client."

(09/09/19 Tr., p.31, L.21 - p.32, L.9.)

Mr. Halbert's counsel also agreed that

Mr. Halbert first asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial on August 5, 2019.

(See

09/09/19 Tr., p.32, L.14-p.33, L.15.)
The State argued that Mr. Halbert had not shown a violation of his statutory right to a
speedy trial. (See 09/19/19 Tr., p.33, L.17 - p.34, L.34.) As for the constitutional right to a
speedy trial, the State conceded that the delay of seventeen months triggered a full inquiry under
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), but the other three factors in the Barker v. Wingo
balancing test did not support finding a violation. (See 09/09/19 Tr., p.35, L.2 - p.47, L.20.)
After a recess, the district court found "that under 19-3501(1) and (2), the defendant's
statutory rights to speedy trial have not been violated in this case." (09/09/19 Tr., p.52, Ls.5-17.)
On the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the court noted, "The State concedes that the length
of the delay in this case triggers a balancing test under Barker v. Wingo." (09/09/19 Tr., p.53,
Ls.16-19.) The district court explained that Idaho courts had adopted the Barker v. Wingo test,
and "[t]he balancing test has the court weigh the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the
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defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice alleged by the defendant."
(09/09/19 Tr., p.53, L.19 -p.54, L.1.)
The district court determined: "In this case there has been a delay. The Complaint was
filed March 23 rd of2018." (09/09/19 Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3.) While Mr. Halbert "testified that he was
given a copy of the Complaint and Warrant in June of 2018," the court determined, "the record
shows that that Warrant was not served until February of2019." (09/09/19 Tr., p.54, Ls.3-6.)
Next, the district court determined: "The reason for the delay includes times where
[Mr. Halbert] has either stipulated or requested continuances. Those are the requests for the
preliminary hearings to be continued, the request for a delay in arraignment."

(09/09/19

Tr., p.54, Ls.7-11.) Per the court, Mr. Halbert "specifically also requested that he be transported
back to the Department of Correction[] for medical treatment." (09/09/19 Tr., p.54, Ls.11-13.)
The district court determined, "In additional to those requests for continuances, the reason for the
delay as set forth by the State is for necessary medical treatment of [Mr. Halbert]." (09/09/19
Tr., p.54, Ls.14-17.) The court thought "in addition to that assertion, the fact that [Mr. Halbert]
himself requested to be transported to the Department of Correction[] for treatment and also
requested continuances of his own are to be placed upon [Mr. Halbert] as reasons for delay in
this case." (09/09/19 Tr., p.54, Ls.17-22.)
The district court then determined that Mr. Halbert's "assertion of the right to a speedy
trial was not made until August 5th of 2019, a significant amount of time since the case was
filed." (09/09/19 Tr., p.54, Ls.23-25.) On prejudice, the court determined: "The prejudice that is
alleged by the defendant is speculative at best in this case. No specific prejudice has been
alleged by the defendant." (09/09/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.1-3.) Thus, the district court denied the
motion to dismiss. (09/09/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.4-6.)
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Later, the district court issued a written memorandum decision and order denying
Mr. Halbert's motion to dismiss.

(R., pp.220-232.)

The court again found no violation of

Mr. Halbert's statutory right to a speedy trial. (See R., pp.223-24.) Turning to the constitutional
right to a speedy trial, the district court found that the "13-month delay and subsequent 4-month
delay meets the threshold requirement to trigger further inquiry." (R., pp.225-26.)
On the reason for the delay, the district court determined that Mr. Halbert was severely
injured after the car accident, and the level of care needed to treat his injuries was outside the
normal level provided by the Jerome County Jail, and would have presented a financial hardship
and logistical difficulties.

(See R., pp.227-28.)

Thus, the court determined that the State's

decision to delay transporting Mr. Halbert to Jerome County for thirteen months was a legitimate
reason not to move the case forward. (See R., p.228.) But the district court also determined that
"Jerome County has the duty to provide reasonable medical care for inmates in their custody, and
this factor should not weigh against [Mr. Halbert] in this analysis as it was Jerome County's
conscious decision to delay transporting him from IDOC on account of his medical condition."
(R., p.228.) The court therefore found "the initial 13-month delay to be neutral in this analysis."
(R., p.228.) The district court found "that any subsequent delay following [Mr. Halbert's] arrival
in Jerome County was attributable to, agreed to, or acquiesced to by [Mr. Halbert] in the
prosecution bringing him to trial." (R., p.228.)
Regarding the assertion of the right to speedy trial, the district court determined that
Mr. Halbert did not assert his right to a speedy trial before August 5, 2019, and, "therefore, this
factor does not weigh in favor of finding of speedy trial violation." (R., pp.228-29.)
With respect to prejudice, the district court determined Mr. Halbert "faced no additional
risk of being subjected to oppressive pretrial incarceration in this case given the revocation of his
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parole in a separate criminal case," and he "did not demonstrate that his anxiety or concern was
heightened by the delay." (R., pp.229-30.) The court also determined that Mr. Halbert "has
failed to demonstrate he has suffered meaningful or even any specific prejudice by the State's
delay in bringing this case to trial." (R., pp.230-31.) Balancing the four above factors and other
relevant circumstances, the district court determined that the "factors do not weigh in favor of
finding a speedy trial violation." (R., p.231.)
In the interim, the district court granted the State's motion for leave to file an amended
Information with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (See R., pp.176-83, 193-95.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Halbert agreed to plead guilty to felony DUI and vehicular
manslaughter, and the State agreed to withdraw the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(See R., pp.199-212. See generally 09/16/19 Tr.) In the Guilty Plea Advisory, Mr. Halbert

indicated he was entering a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the adverse
ruling on his "motion to dismiss." (R., p.205.) At the change of plea hearing, the district court
stated it had received "a Guilty Plea Advisory." (09/16/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-17.) The district
court accepted Mr. Halbert's guilty plea. (09/16/19 Tr., p.32, Ls.12-20.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with one year fixed, for felony
DUI, and a sentence of fifteen years fixed, for vehicular manslaughter. (R., pp.263-68.) The
sentence for felony DUI would run consecutively to the sentence for vehicular manslaughter, and
the sentence in this case would run consecutively to the sentence imposed in the separate case
where Mr. Halbert had been on parole. (See R., p.264.)
Mr. Halbert filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.276-81.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Halbert's motion to dismiss, because the delay in
this case violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Halbert's Motion To Dismiss, Because The Delay
In This Case Violated His Federal And State Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Halbert asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss, because

the delay in this case violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The
total delay of seventeen months was presumptively prejudicial. Contrary to the district court's
determinations, Mr. Halbert's timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to
Mr. Halbert through the delay impairing his defense, supported finding a violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Thus, the district court erred when it found no violation of
the right to a speedy trial under the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), balancing test.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to speedy trial presents a

mixed question of law and fact." State v. Morgan, 162 Idaho 550, 553 (Ct. App. 2017) (citing

State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257 (2000)). An appellate court "will defer to the trial court's
findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence," but "will exercise free
review of the trial court's conclusions oflaw." Id. (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 257).

C.

The Delay In This Case Violated Mr. Halbert's Federal And State Constitutional Rights
To A Speedy Trial
"The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees to criminal

defendants the right to a speedy trial." State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117 (2001). "This right is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. "In addition, Article I, § 13, of
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the Constitution of the State of Idaho also guarantees the accused in a criminal case the right to a
speedy trial." Id.
"In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court adopted a four-part balancing test
to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment has been
infringed." Young, 136 Idaho at 117. The Idaho Supreme Court in Young explained, "We have
adopted that same test in determining whether the right to a speedy trial under our state
constitution has been violated." Id. (citing State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474 (1975)). "The four
factors to be balanced are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
assertion of accused's right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the accused." Id. This
balancing test, "in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed ...
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis." Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. at 530.
Mr. Halbert asserts that, under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test, the delay in this case
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The total delay of seventeen
months was presumptively prejudicial.

Mr. Halbert's medical treatment caused most of the

delay, meaning that the reason for the delay was largely neutral. Mr. Halbert asserted his right to
a speedy trial two months before the trial date, and this timely assertion actually weighed in
favor of a violation. The prejudice to Mr. Halbert through the delay impairing his defense also
supported finding a violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Thus,
the district court erred when it found no violation of the right to a speedy trial under the Barker v.

Wingo balancing test.

1.

Length of the Delay

"The first factor, the length of the delay, is a triggering mechanism." Young, 136 Idaho at
117 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514). "Until there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, it is unnecessary to inquire into the other three factors." Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514). "Under the Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the date
there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and
holding to answer a criminal charge."' Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 407 U.S. 307, 320
(1971)). "Under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal
charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Id. (citing State v. Stuart,
110 Idaho 163 (1986)).
Here, the seventeen-month delay was presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger a
full examination of the Barker v. Wingo factors. The State filed the Criminal Complaint against
Mr. Halbert on March 23, 2018. (R., p.13.) Mr. Halbert was arraigned on April 29, 2019, the
same date the State filed the Information against him. (R., pp.103, 115.) The district court set
the jury trial to commence on September 24, 2019. (R., p.110.) This total delay of seventeen
months was presumptively prejudicial. See, e.g., Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474 (holding a delay of
fourteen months was presumptively prejudicial).
Indeed, the district court properly found "that this 13-month delay and subsequent 4month delay meets the threshold requirement to trigger further inquiry." (R., pp.225-26.) The
State likewise recognized, "the 17-month delay in this matter is sufficient to trigger inquiry in
whether [Mr. Halbert's] constitutional speedy trial rights were violated."

(R., p.169.)

The

seventeen-month delay was presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger a full examination
of the Barker v. Wingo factors.
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2.

Reason for the Delay

"The second factor is the reason for the delay." Young, 136 Idaho at 117. The United
States Supreme Court has explained, "different weights should be assigned to different reasons."
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531. "A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the

defense should be weighted heavily against the government." Id. In contrast, "A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must
rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Id. However, "a valid reason, such as
a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay." Id.
The district court found that the thirteen-month delay was "neutral in this analysis,"
because the decision to delay transporting Mr. Halbert to Jerome County so he could undergo
medical treatment at IDOC, "was legitimate and is not attributed directly to" Mr. Halbert. (See
R., pp.228.) The district court also found "that any subsequent delay following [Mr. Halbert's]
arrival in Jerome County was attributable to, agreed to, or acquiesced to by" Mr. Halbert,
through his motions to continue, waiver of the preliminary hearing, and vacation of a status
conference. (R., p.228.) Thus, the district court determined that the remaining four months of
the delay was attributable to Mr. Halbert. (See R., pp.226-28.)
With thirteen months of the delay neutral, and the other four months attributable to Mr.
Halbert, the reason for a delay factor does weigh somewhat against a violation of the right to a
speedy trial, although this factor is largely neutral.

3.

Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial

"The third factor is the accused's assertion of his right to a speedy trial." Young, 136
Idaho at 117. The Barker v. Wingo Court observed, "The more serious the deprivation, the more
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likely a defendant is to complain."

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531.

"The defendant's

assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining
whether the defendant is being deprived of the right." Id. at 531-32. The Barker v. Wingo Court
further emphasized "that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove
that he was denied a speedy trial." Id. at 532.
Here, rather than fail to assert the right, Mr. Halbert asserted his right to a speedy trial in
his Motion to Dismiss, filed on August 5, 2019. (R., p.131.) This was about two months before
the date of the jury trial, September 24, 2019. (See R., p.110.) The district court nonetheless
highlighted that nothing on the record indicated that Mr. Halbert had asserted his right before
August 5, 2019, and Mr. Halbert had vacated a status conference to address pre-trial issues in
order to be transported to IDOC to continue his medical treatment. (See R., p.229.) The district
court determined: "Instead of raising this earlier, [Mr. Halbert] waited until two months before
his trial to raise this issue for the first time. The Court then heard arguments on this Motion just
weeks before the scheduled trial date." (R., p.229.) According to the district court, "At no point
before this Motion did [Mr. Halbert] assert his right to speedy trial, and, therefore, this factor
does not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." (R., p.229.)
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that an accused's assertion of the right to a
speedy trial two months before trial weighed in favor of finding a violation.

In State v.

Hernandez, 163 Idaho 9 (Ct. App. 2017), the defendant was arrested on January 9, 2015, and
later charged with multiple violent felonies. See id. at 12. The district court initially set the trial
for June 9, 2015, but after granting the State's motion for a continuance, rescheduled the trial for
September 28, 2015. Id. On August 11, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the bulk
of the charges, "on the basis of an alleged speedy trial violation." Id. After the district court
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denied the motion to dismiss, and the jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, the
defendant appealed. See id.
On appeal, the Hernandez Court addressed whether the defendant's federal and state
constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been violated.

See id. at 602-03.

Regarding the

defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, the Court held, "The third factor weighs in
favor of Hernandez as he timely asserted his right to a speedy trial." Id. at 603. The Hernandez
Court ultimately held that the delay did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that assertions of the right to a speedy trial mere
days before the trial, unlike the assertion in Hernandez, weighed against a violation.

E.g.,

State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 355 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Lopez did not assert his right to speedy

trial until he filed his motion to dismiss ... two days before the date ultimately set for trial. ...
The lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right weighs heavily against his contention
that the right was violated."); State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 37 (Ct. App. 1996)
("Rodriquez-Perez's first unequivocal invocation of speedy trial guarantees occurred when he
filed his motion to dismiss ... some eleven days before the scheduled trial. The defendant's
assertion of his rights at a relatively late point in the proceedings does not weigh in favor of
dismissal under the Barker balancing process.").
Just as the assertion of the right to a speedy trial weighed in favor for the defendant in
Hernandez, the assertion here should weigh in favor of Mr. Halbert.

Like the Hernandez

defendant, Mr. Halbert asserted his right to a speedy trial about two months before the trial date.
(See R., p.229.) Thus, contrary to the district court's determination, the timely assertion of a
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right to speedy trial factor supports a finding that the delay violated Mr. Halbert's constitutional
right to a speedy trial. See Hernandez, 163 Idaho at 12.

4.

Prejudice to Mr. Halbert

"The fourth factor is prejudice to the accused caused by the delay." Young, 136 Idaho at
118. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized "that prejudice is a central factor in analyzing the
right to speedy trial." State v. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 313 (1981). "Prejudice, of course,
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532. The Barker v. Wingo Court "identified
three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Id.
"Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Id. The Barker v. Wingo Court explained: "If
witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past." Id.

"Loss of

memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown." Id.
The district court m this case determined that, because Mr. Halbert's "pretrial
incarceration comes from an entirely separate criminal case predating these charges," he "faced
no additional risk of being subjected to oppressive pretrial incarceration in this case given the
revocation of his parole in a separate criminal case."

(R., p.230.)

The district court also

determined that Mr. Halbert "did not demonstrate that his anxiety or concern was heightened by
the delay."

(R., p.230.)

Thus, the district court determined that "the first two interests

safeguarded by the 'prejudice' factor are minimally, if at all, affected by the delay." (R., p.230.)
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With respect to whether the delay impaired Mr. Halbert's defense, the district court
determined the additional time the State had to collect evidence and prepare for trial "alone did
not demonstrate substantial prejudice to the Defendant."

(R., p.230.)

The district court

determined that the State could have instead filed charges against Mr. Halbert at the end of the
five-year statute of limitations, and Mr. Halbert would have faced the same potential
disadvantage and prejudice without triggering a means to dismiss the case. (See R., p.230.) The
district court determined that Mr. Halbert "has failed to demonstrate he has suffered meaningful
or even any specific prejudice by the State's delay in bringing this case to trial." (R., pp.230-31.)
However, Mr. Halbert submits that he showed sufficient prejudice from the delay to have
this factor weigh in favor of a violation. As he asserted in the Motion to Dismiss: "The State has
had over a year to build its case against Mr. Halbert. Now, Mr. Halbert must contact witnesses,
gather evidence, and attempt to recall facts, times, places and people more than one [year] after
the incident; this puts Mr. Halbert at a significant disadvantage and is highly prejudicial to his
case." (R., p.133.) More succinctly, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Halbert's
counsel asserted, "So due to the delay . . . time has passed and we would contend that that is
prejudicial to our client." (09/09/19 Tr., p.32, Ls.7-9.) The prejudice factor therefore weighs in
favor of a finding that the delay violated Mr. Halbert's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

5.

Balancing

None of the four Barker v. Wingo factors are "either a necessary or sufficient condition to
the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial," and they are instead "related factors and
must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 533. "In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still

engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id. "But, because we are dealing with a
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fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the
accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution." Id.
In Mr. Halbert's case, consideration of the four factors leads to the conclusion that the
delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The seventeen-month delay was

presumptively prejudicial. The reason for the delay weighs somewhat against finding a violation
because of the four-month period caused by Mr. Halbert's requests, but the reason factor is
largely neutral. The other two factors weigh in favor of finding a violation. Mr. Halbert asserted
his right to a speedy trial in a timely fashion, and the delay prejudiced him by impairing his
defense.

In sum, under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test, the delay in this case violated

Mr. Halbert's federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The district court erred
when it found no violation of Mr. Halbert's right to a speedy trial.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Halbert respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction, reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss, and
remand this case to the district court with instruction to dismiss with prejudice this case.
DATED this 20 th day of July, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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